Radicalization and Terrorism in Germany: A Case Study of the Solingen Attack and the Threat of ISPK
1. Introduction
1.1. Overview of the Solingen Attack
On August 23, 2024, a knife attack during a city festival in Solingen shook Germany. The attack, which took place in a crowded marketplace, resulted in the deaths of three people and injured eight others. It quickly became apparent that the attacker, a 26-year-old Syrian asylum seeker, had connections to the terrorist organization Islamic State (IS). IS claimed responsibility for the attack, stating that it was a retaliation for the suffering of Muslims in Palestine and other parts of the world. The attack specifically targeted a group of Christians, emphasizing the religiously motivated nature of the incident.
1.2. Significance of the Attack in the Context of Islamist Terrorism in Germany
The Solingen attack is part of a series of Islamist-motivated terror acts in Germany that have gained intensity over the years. After the devastating events at Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz in 2016, where IS also claimed responsibility, the Solingen incident marks the first IS claim in Germany in eight years. This highlights that the threat of Islamist terrorism remains acute. Particularly concerning is the influence of IS affiliates like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which are increasingly active in Germany, presenting new challenges for security authorities.
1.3. Research Questions and Aim of the Article
This article aims to analyze the Solingen attack in detail and place it within the broader context of Islamist terrorism in Germany. The central research questions are:
By exploring these questions, the article seeks to contribute to the understanding of the current threat landscape and suggest possible improvements in terrorism prevention and countermeasures.
2. Background and Context
2.1. Overview of the Islamic State (IS) Terror Group and Its Affiliates
The Islamic State (IS), also known as Daesh, is a jihadist-Salafist terrorist organization that gained global notoriety in 2014 when it seized large territories in Iraq and Syria and declared a so-called “caliphate.” IS aims to establish a global Islamic state based on its strict interpretation of Islamic law (Sharia). By strategically using social media and propaganda channels, IS was able to recruit and inspire followers worldwide to commit terrorist acts. Despite significant military losses and the loss of its territory, IS remains a considerable threat through its global affiliates and networks.
IS affiliates are active in various regions, each pursuing specific goals and methods. These groups operate largely autonomously but are ideologically and often operationally linked to IS’s core. A prominent example is ISKP (Islamic State Khorasan Province), which operates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and increasingly in Central Asia, known for its particularly brutal attacks. Through its extensive networks and the spread of its propaganda, ISKP poses a growing threat to Western countries, including Germany.
2.2. The Specific Role of ISKP in Germany
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has gained importance in recent years, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), where security authorities have repeatedly warned of the growing threat posed by this group. ISKP recruits mainly in Central Asia, including Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Turkmen, and uses these networks to radicalize and mobilize Muslims living in Germany for attacks.
German security authorities have uncovered several ISKP cells in Germany planning terrorist attacks. Particularly in NRW, there is heightened attention to the activities of this group, as several suspects linked to ISKP have been arrested. These developments show that ISKP is increasingly seen as one of the main threats in Germany, particularly due to its ability to promote radicalization and terror planning through social media and messaging services.
2.3. Historical Cases of IS-Related Attacks in Germany
Germany has experienced several severe Islamist terrorist attacks in recent years, directly or indirectly linked to IS. The most serious incident occurred on December 19, 2016, at Berlin’s Breitscheidplatz, when Tunisian Islamist Anis Amri drove a stolen truck into a Christmas market. Thirteen people were killed, and dozens were injured. IS claimed responsibility for this attack, making it the most severe IS-related attack in Germany.
Another significant case was the attack on July 18, 2016, when an Afghan refugee attacked passengers with an axe on a regional train in Würzburg, severely injuring several people. This attack was also claimed by IS. Such incidents have led to IS being regarded as one of the greatest threats to national security in Germany.
In addition to these major attacks, there have been several smaller but no less significant incidents where individuals or small groups, inspired by IS propaganda, planned or carried out attacks. These incidents underscore that the threat from IS and its affiliates, such as ISKP, remains present and may even intensify.
3. Radicalization Processes
3.1. Mechanisms of Radicalization in Germany
Radicalization is a complex and multifaceted process influenced by both individual and social factors in Germany. The mechanisms of radicalization vary from person to person but often involve a combination of personal crisis, identity conflicts, and the search for belonging and purpose. Young men in a phase of disorientation are particularly vulnerable to extremist ideologies. Persons with a migration background who feel socially isolated or have experienced discrimination are especially at risk.
Another mechanism of radicalization is contact with radicalized networks or individuals who act as mentors and intensify the radicalization process. These networks offer not only ideological training but also a community that provides emotional support and a clear, albeit dangerous, life perspective. In Germany, various Islamist networks are active, particularly in major cities like Berlin, Hamburg, and regions such as North Rhine-Westphalia.
3.2. The Influence of Social Media and IS Propaganda
Social media plays a central role in the radicalization process, particularly through the dissemination of extremist propaganda. IS has effectively used these platforms to target potential recruits and spread radicalizing content. Through platforms like Telegram, Twitter, and Facebook, as well as specialized forums and websites, videos, texts, and images are shared that glorify violence and portray a heroic image of the jihadist fighter.
IS propaganda is particularly designed to fill narrative gaps caused by personal and social isolation of the target individuals. It offers simple answers to complex questions and establishes a clear distinction between “Good” (the jihadist fighters) and “Evil” (Western states, “infidels”). This simplistic dichotomy can be very appealing to individuals in crisis and accelerate the radicalization process.
Additionally, radical groups deliberately use algorithms and bots to disseminate their content to the right target groups. The propaganda is personalized and sent specifically to those identified as vulnerable based on their online activities. This amplifies the impact and effectiveness of radical messages.
3.3. A Special Look at the Role of Conflicts in the Middle East (e.g., Gaza War)
Conflicts in the Middle East, such as the Gaza War, play a central role in the radicalization of Muslims in Western countries. These conflicts are instrumentalized by radical groups like IS to fuel hatred and a desire for revenge. The reporting on the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population and the portrayal of Israel and its Western allies as aggressors contribute to creating a narrative of oppression that can intensify radicalization processes.
The Gaza War is often used as a symbol of the unjust treatment of Muslims worldwide, which resonates particularly with young, vulnerable Muslims who already feel marginalized. IS and other radical groups exploit these emotions to justify the necessity of violence and revenge, which can lead to terrorist acts in extreme cases.
The linkage of global conflicts to local terrorism is also evident in the Solingen attack, where the perpetrator allegedly carried out the act as “revenge for Muslims in Palestine and elsewhere.” Such global-local connections are characteristic of modern jihadist terrorism and underline the need to understand and address international conflicts in connection with domestic radicalization.
4. Case Study: The Solingen Attack
4.1 Chronological Account of the Attack
On the evening of August 23, 2024, during the celebrations for the 650th anniversary of the city of Solingen, a brutal knife attack took place in the central Fronhof marketplace. At around 9:40 PM, a 26-year-old man randomly attacked visitors at the city festival, killing three people and seriously injuring eight others. The perpetrator used a quick and targeted approach, repeatedly stabbing his victims in the neck before blending into the crowd and fleeing.
The attack caused immediate panic among festival-goers. During the event, the famous DJ Topic was performing on a nearby stage. On the police’s instructions, he continued his performance to prevent mass panic. The music was stopped only about 10 to 15 minutes later, and the audience was informed about the incidents.
Later that evening, the perpetrator, a Syrian asylum seeker, voluntarily turned himself in to the police. His clothes were bloodstained, and he confessed to the attack. Intensive evidence gathering and witness statements confirmed his guilt. It also became known that the Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the attack, directing the investigation toward a terrorist motive.
4.2. The Perpetrator’s Profile: Background, Radicalization Path, Motive
The suspected perpetrator, a 26-year-old man of Syrian origin, came from Deir al-Zor, a region heavily affected by the civil war and IS presence. He arrived in Germany at the end of 2022 and applied for asylum in Bielefeld. Before his attack, he was not known to German security authorities as an Islamist extremist, indicating that his radicalization process either went unnoticed or intensified after his arrival in Germany.
His radicalization path is typical of so-called “lone wolves,” influenced by extremist propaganda available online. Reports suggest he had contacts with radical networks, possibly through social media, that reinforced his intentions. His motive, as described by IS, was revenge for the killing of Muslims in conflict zones like Palestine. This rhetoric fits into the IS narrative, which uses global conflicts to justify and promote local attacks.
The fact that the perpetrator turned himself in may indicate that he either expected a quick martyrdom or viewed his act as a completed “sacrifice” for his ideology, with no plans for escape or survival.
4.3. Analysis of IS’s Claims and Propaganda
Shortly after the attack, IS’s propaganda arm, Amak, released a claim of responsibility, describing the perpetrator as a member of IS. The attack was presented as a targeted revenge action against Christians, contextualized within the support of Western states for Israel and their actions in the Gaza Strip. The claim frames the attack as part of a global jihad against the “enemies of Islam” and uses the geopolitical situation in the Middle East to justify and glorify the attack.
IS propaganda uses such events to spread its ideological message and motivate further individuals to radicalize and act. The claim of responsibility could also be seen as an attempt to maintain relevance and influence despite military defeats in Syria and Iraq, particularly through individual acts of violence in Western countries.
The connection to Palestine in IS propaganda is particularly noteworthy, as IS has no direct ties to Hamas or other Palestinian groups. This demonstrates the flexibility of IS propaganda and how adeptly it uses current geopolitical events to target a broader audience.
Overall, the analysis of the claim and propaganda highlights how IS attempts to embed local acts of violence into its global ideology, thereby maintaining its influence even outside its original territories.
5. The Role of ISKP in NRW
5.1. Investigation of ISKP Networks in North Rhine-Westphalia
The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) has become a central player in the field of Islamist terrorism in Germany in recent years, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW). Originally active in Afghanistan and Pakistan, ISKP has established a foothold in Germany through its networks. In NRW, the group’s activities focus primarily on recruiting and radicalizing individuals from Central Asia, such as Tajiks, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Turkmens.
These networks often consist of small, isolated cells that are difficult to identify and monitor. ISKP uses social media and encrypted communication services to mobilize its followers and issue instructions. These cells often operate autonomously but are ideologically closely linked to ISKP leadership. The radicalized diaspora in NRW is particularly vulnerable to the group’s propaganda, living in a state of cultural and social marginalization that is deliberately exploited by the terrorists.
ISKP networks in NRW are not only focused on recruitment but also on planning and executing attacks. These networks take advantage of their proximity to major cities and the high anonymity in urban areas to operate undetected. There is evidence that these cells receive support from abroad, both financially and logistically, further increasing the threat posed by ISKP.
5.2. Previous Arrests and Investigations Related to ISKP
In recent years, there have been several significant arrests and investigations in NRW related to ISKP. A prominent case occurred in July 2023 when police arrested seven terror suspects in various locations across NRW. These men were suspected of having formed a terrorist organization and being in close contact with ISKP members abroad. The arrests followed months of surveillance and covert investigations that showed the group was planning attacks in Germany.
In December 2023, German authorities received information from foreign intelligence services about planned attacks on Cologne Cathedral, again with links to ISKP. This information led to heightened security measures and increased police presence in NRW, particularly around potential targets like Cologne Cathedral.
These events show that ISKP in NRW is not just a theoretical threat but that there are concrete attempts to carry out terrorist attacks. German security authorities have responded to this threat with an increased focus on monitoring individuals and networks from Central Asia, particularly in regions with a high density of diaspora communities.
5.3. Security Situation and Threat Assessment in NRW
The security situation in NRW is tense due to ISKP’s activities. The threat of Islamist terrorism is classified as “abstract high,” meaning an attack can be expected at any time. The NRW Ministry of the Interior and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) closely monitor the situation and have significantly expanded their counterterrorism capacities in recent years.
A particular focus is on the early detection of radicalization processes and the monitoring of potential threats. Intensive efforts are being made to dismantle ISKP networks and disrupt their communication channels. However, the threat remains, as ISKP continues its efforts to maintain a presence in Germany through digital platforms and personal networks.
The threat is exacerbated by ongoing instability in the home countries of many potential recruits, as conflicts in Afghanistan and surrounding regions provide fertile ground for radicalization and terrorism. This requires German security authorities in NRW to maintain a constant state of heightened vigilance.
In summary, the role of ISKP in NRW poses a serious threat, strengthened by the group’s global connections and its ability to infiltrate and utilize local networks. The previous arrests and investigations show that German security authorities are vigilant, but the threat from ISKP is far from neutralized.
6. Response of Security Authorities
6.1. Measures of German Security Authorities Before and After the Attack
German security authorities, particularly in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), have made considerable efforts in recent years to counter the threat of Islamist terrorism. Before the Solingen attack, these measures focused on monitoring and dismantling radicalized networks, identifying potential threats, and expanding cooperation with international intelligence services. The arrests of ISKP members in NRW in 2023 show that authorities are actively working to detect and neutralize terrorist cells.
After the knife attack in Solingen, security measures were significantly tightened across the state. Interior Minister Herbert Reul ordered an increase in police presence, particularly at major events and potential target locations such as churches and public places. Additionally, investigations were intensified to identify possible accomplices of the perpetrator and prevent further attacks.
Authorities also increased their cooperation with international partners to exchange information about potential threats. This cooperation is particularly important because many terrorist networks operate transnationally, with members often active in multiple countries.
6.2. Evaluation of Prevention and Response Strategies
The prevention strategies of German security authorities have proven effective in many cases, particularly through the successful arrest of suspects and the foiling of planned attacks. The proactive monitoring of potential threats and the dismantling of networks like ISKP have contributed to reducing the immediate threat of terrorist activities.
However, the Solingen attack shows that despite these efforts, there are still gaps in prevention. In particular, the radicalization of lone actors, which often goes unnoticed by security authorities, poses a significant challenge. Such “lone wolves” can often strike faster and with fewer resources, limiting the authorities’ response options.
The response strategies following the Solingen attack were swift and targeted. The increased police presence and the intensive search for the perpetrator led to his quick arrest, highlighting the efficiency of the response forces. However, the fact that the perpetrator was able to radicalize unnoticed indicates that prevention measures need to be further improved, particularly in the area of early detection and analysis of online activities.
6.3. Discussion of Challenges in Counterterrorism
Counterterrorism in Germany, particularly in NRW, faces several challenges. One of the biggest is the increasing shift of radicalization into the digital space. Social media and encrypted communication platforms allow terrorist organizations like ISKP to operate unnoticed by security authorities and mobilize followers. This development requires new approaches to monitoring and analyzing digital content, without overly restricting citizens’ freedoms.
Another issue is the transnational nature of modern terrorism. Many radicalized individuals have connections abroad, whether through family, ethnic, or ideological ties. This complicates the work of national security authorities, as they rely on cooperation with foreign intelligence and police agencies to detect and neutralize threats early.
Additionally, the integration of refugees and migrants, particularly from crisis regions such as Syria, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, poses another challenge. These groups are often targets for radicalization attempts by terrorist organizations. German society must find ways to promote the integration of these individuals while remaining vigilant against possible radicalization tendencies.
Finally, the balance between security and civil liberties remains a constant challenge. While it is necessary to monitor potential threats and dismantle terrorist networks, this must be done in a way that does not excessively infringe on fundamental rights. Protecting privacy and avoiding discrimination are central concerns that must be considered in all counterterrorism measures.
Overall, the response to the Solingen attack shows that German security authorities are well-prepared to respond to acute threats. At the same time, the prevention of radicalization and the fight against international terrorism remain long-term tasks that require continuous adaptation and improvement of strategies.
7. Discussion
7.1. Comparison with Other Islamist Attacks in Germany and Europe
The Solingen attack fits into a series of Islamist-motivated attacks carried out in recent years in both Germany and Europe. A notable point of comparison is the attack on the Berlin Christmas market in 2016, where Anis Amri, a Tunisian asylum seeker, drove a truck into a crowd, killing 13 people. Like the Solingen attack, IS claimed responsibility for the act and used it for its propaganda. Both cases highlight the danger posed by radicalized individuals who, often without direct instructions from a terrorist organization, are inspired by its ideology to commit extreme violence.
Another comparable case is the axe attack on a regional train near Würzburg in July 2016, where a young Afghan refugee severely injured several passengers. Here, too, IS propaganda played a decisive role in the radicalization. These incidents show that IS and its affiliates can incite individuals in Europe to violence, even without direct contact or logistical support.
At the European level, the attacks in Paris (November 2015) and Brussels (March 2016) are noteworthy, carried out by organized cells in close contact with IS leadership. In contrast, the “lone wolves” in Germany often act in isolation but can still cause significant harm. The Solingen attack shows that this type of attack remains a continuous threat in Germany.
7.2. Implications of the Research Findings for Prevention Work
The investigation of the Solingen attack has several important implications for prevention work in Germany. First, it is clear that the radicalization of individuals, particularly through online propaganda, remains a significant challenge. This requires intensified monitoring and analysis of digital communication platforms where radical content is disseminated. At the same time, de-radicalization and prevention programs need to be intensified, targeting at-risk individuals before they fall under the influence of extremist ideologies.
Another important finding is the need to improve the integration of migrants and refugees to reduce their vulnerability to radicalization. Individuals who are socially isolated or experience discrimination are particularly susceptible to extremist ideologies. Therefore, integration programs should be more strongly promoted and linked with prevention measures to detect and prevent potential radicalization early.
The study also highlights that the international connections of terrorist organizations like ISKP require cross-border cooperation. German security authorities need to expand their cooperation with international partners to effectively combat the global networks of terrorism.
7.3. Possibilities for Improving Counterterrorism in Germany
To further improve counterterrorism in Germany, several measures are necessary. First, the early detection of radicalization should be strengthened through the use of new technologies and data analysis tools. For example, the use of artificial intelligence (AI) could help identify suspicious behavior patterns on social media early and initiate interventions.
Second, cooperation between various state institutions and organizations involved in prevention work needs to be improved. This includes not only the exchange of information between police and intelligence services but also the involvement of educational institutions, social services, and civil society organizations. A multidisciplinary approach can help strengthen society’s resilience against extremist ideologies.
Third, the legal framework for dealing with threats and radicalized individuals should be further developed. This could include stricter measures for monitoring and, if necessary, detaining individuals classified as acute threats. At the same time, however, civil liberties must be safeguarded to ensure a balance between security and freedom.
Finally, it is important to further expand international cooperation. Since many terrorist networks operate globally, cooperation with foreign intelligence and police agencies is essential. Germany should continue to participate actively in international counterterrorism programs and intensify its diplomatic efforts to stabilize crisis regions to reduce the breeding grounds for radicalization and terrorism in the long term.
In summary, the Solingen attack clearly shows that the threat of Islamist terrorism in Germany must continue to be taken seriously. While the security authorities’ current measures are largely effective, continuous efforts and adjustments are needed to address the evolving threat landscape. Improving prevention work, strengthening social integration, and international cooperation are crucial factors in preventing future attacks and ensuring long-term security in Germany.
8. Conclusions and Recommendations
8.1. Summary of Key Findings
The Solingen attack of August 23, 2024, once again underscores the ongoing threat of Islamist terrorism in Germany. The attack, carried out by a radicalized lone actor with connections to the terrorist organization Islamic State (IS), highlights the danger posed by so-called “lone wolves.” These perpetrators, often inspired by online propaganda, can carry out unpredictable and devastating attacks despite the efforts of security authorities to dismantle terrorist networks.
The investigation of the attack revealed that IS propaganda remains effective in radicalizing individuals and motivating them to commit violent acts. Particularly concerning is the use of global conflicts such as the Gaza War to justify locally motivated terrorist acts, creating a dangerous link that must be disrupted. The role of ISKP in NRW, supported by international connections, underscores the need for increased surveillance and cooperation both nationally and internationally.
8.2. Suggestions for Future Research on Radicalization and Terrorism
Future research should focus on the mechanisms of online radicalization, particularly the role of social media and encrypted communication platforms. It is important to better understand how extremist content is disseminated and which strategies are most effective in curbing this spread.
Another area of research should be the integration and de-radicalization of migrants and refugees, particularly those from conflict regions. Studies could focus on identifying the social, cultural, and psychological factors that increase vulnerability to radicalization and how these risks can be mitigated through targeted measures.
Finally, research should evaluate and further develop the effectiveness of existing prevention and intervention programs in Germany. It would be beneficial to examine regional differences in radicalization and the associated challenges to improve strategies at a local level.
8.3. Recommendations for Policy Measures and Security Strategies
By implementing these recommendations, Germany can further improve its security strategy and better prepare for the threat of Islamist terrorism. Continuous adaptation to new challenges and the promotion of a resilient and inclusive society are key to preventing future attacks and ensuring national security.
9. Literaturverzeichnis
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Nordrhein-Westfalen Innenministerium. (2022): Lagebericht: Islamistische Bedrohung in Nordrhein-Westfalen. Innenministerium NRW.
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Schmid, Alex P. (2024): The Role of ‘Foreign Fighters’ in Islamist Terrorism and Their Impact on Homeland Security in the West. In: Journal on Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism.
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Europol. (2023): Terrorism Situation and Trend Report. Europol.